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I. Croatia in the revolutionary era, 1848-1849
On the eve of the revolutionary events of 1848, the Triune Kingdom of 
Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia was 1848 territorially divided, economically 
backward and politically weak.1 Only Civil Croatia, which consisted of the 
three central Croatian and Slavonian counties, had a very limited degree of au-
tonomy, more akin to a province than a state. The Military Frontier, Istria and 
Dalmatia were subject to direct rule by Vienna and were entirely separate from 
Civil Croatia. The traditional danger of Habsburg centralism was augmented, 
as of the 1820s, by the even greater danger of burgeoning Hungarian national-
ism, which aspired to transform Hungary into a unified Hungarian state with 
Hungarian as the official language. During the 1830s and 1840s, a new stratum 
of the national intelligentsia emerged among the Croats and, to a lesser extent, 
the Serbs, which resisted Hungarian policies, largely depending on normally 
concealed support from the Viennese court. The Hungarians had the support 
of certain groups and individuals inside the Triune Kingdom, from the petty 
nobility of Turopolje (south of Zagreb) to certain Slavonian magnates, but 
these remained relatively weak. The so-called Illyrian Movement attempted to
1   Numerous historiographic works cover the events in Croatia immediately prior to 1848 and 
the Illyrian Movement: Jaroslav Šidak, Studije iz hrvatske povijesti XIX stoljeća (Zagreb: Školska 
knjiga, 1973); Petar Korunić, Jugoslavizam i federalizam u hrvatskom nacionalnom preporodu 
1835-1875 (Zagreb: Globus, 1989); Tomislav Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret 1848-1849. go-
dine. Ustanove, ideje, ciljevi, politička kultura (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 2000); Nikša Stančić, Hrvats-
ka nacija i nacionalizam u 19. i 20. stoljeću (Zagreb: Barbat, 2002); Vlasta Švoger,  Zagrebačko 
liberalno novinstvo 1848-1852. i stvaranje moderne Hrvatske (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za pov-
ijest, 2007).
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protect what remained of the political autonomy of Civil Croatia and imple-
ment limited modernizing reforms in the cultural and economic fields. The Il-
lyrians advocated cultural bonds between the South Slav peoples, particularly 
those inside the Habsburg Monarchy, but politically they were restricted to the 
defense of the jura municipalia, which the Hungarians wanted to abolish. Civil 
Croatia was dominated by aristocratic privilege, the municipal organization 
of counties and Latin as the official language, all factors which impeded the 
rise of new national forces. The most notable bulletin of the Illyrian Move-
ment was Ljudevit Gaj’s Novine horvatzke, which was published under various 
names after 1835 and, after its first year of publication, in the Croatian Shtoka-
vian language. At the end of 1847, the Croatian territorial parliament (Sabor) 
passed a decision to introduce the national language into public affairs, which 
the Croatian-Slavonian counties began to implement on their own despite the 
lack of sanction from the king.
Unrest broke out in Vienna in March 1848, followed by the downfall of the 
hated Chancellor Metternich, the symbol of the pre-March (Vormärz) era. The 
Hungarian elite took advantage of the Viennese court’s weakness and forced 
major political concessions from the king, which gave Hungary the status of 
a de facto independent state, with departments handling foreign, military and 
financial affairs. According to the constitutional laws enacted by the Hungarian 
assembly in April 1848, the Slavonian counties were supposed to be directly 
merged with Hungary, while a narrower Croatia would only retain a veneer 
of autonomy. The commencement of the revolution inspired many national 
and political movements to make their own political, economic and cultural 
demands. Most often they sought the restoration or establishment of regional 
and provincial autonomy within the framework of ethnic borders or beyond, 
depending on the aspirations of individual national elites. In the case of the 
Croats, the basic demands from the initial period in March and April 1848 
consisted of the restoration of the Triune Kingdom’s territorial integrity and 
political autonomy, the introduction of the national language in public affairs, 
clerical and economic reforms, the creation of an autonomous government, 
the abolishment of serfdom and aristocratic privilege, freedom of the press, 
tax equality, etc.2 Initially the most important demand was the annexation of 
Dalmatia and the Military Frontier to Civil Croatia, an aspiration expressed 
by many Croatian public personalities and politicians. However, there was an 
2  Iskra Iveljić, Josip Kolanović and Nikša Stančić, (eds.) Hrvatski državni sabor 1 (Zagreb: 
Hrvatski državni arhiv, 2001): 74-90, 92-99, 115-118. There is much literature on the Croa-
tian political movement of 1848-1849: J. Šidak, Studije iz hrvatske povijesti za revolucije 1848-
49 (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1979); Petar Korunić, Jugoslavenska ideologija u hrvatskoj i slov-
enskoj politici. Hrvatsko-slovenski politički odnosi 1848-1870 (Zagreb: Globus, 1986); “Hrvatski 
nacionalni i politički program 1848/49. godine. Prilog Poznavanju porijekla hrvatske nacije i 
države Hrvatske,” Povijesni prilozi 11, 1992:179-252; “Hrvatski nacionalni program i društvene 
promjene za revolucije 1848/49. godine,” Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest 31, 1998:9-39; 
“Osnovice građanskog društva u Hrvatskoj za revolucije 1848-49. godine,” Radovi Zavoda za 
hrvatsku povijest 32-33, 2001:69-104; T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret; V. Švoger, Zagrebačko 
liberalno novinstvo.
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inadequate response in Dalmatia, dominated by an autonomist intelligentsia, 
and in the Military Frontier, controlled by the military bureaucracy. Among 
the activist journalists and writers (publicists), the most notably active was 
Bogoslav Šulek, an ethnic Slovak writer and journalist, who wrote numerous 
articles in which he called for the territorial integrity of the Triune Kingdom, 
reforms in the Military Frontier and the creation of an accountable domestic 
government. For Šulek, who expressed the opinions of the larger part of the 
Croatian politically-aware public, the basic problem was the unification of the 
Croatian lands into a single political unit with broad political autonomy within 
the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. The incorporation of Dalmatia 
and the Military Frontier into Civil Croatia was particularly important in 
this context. With reference to the Military Frontier, Šulek did not seek 
its decommissioning, but he stressed the importance of dismantling the 
Germanized and bureaucratic system to the benefit of constitutional reforms.3 
Many articles were published in Zagreb’s newspapers in April and May 1848, 
most of which advocated preservation of the frontier system due to the tense 
political and military conditions, but with the implementation of much-needed 
reforms, particularly the introduction of constitutional and political freedoms. 
A minority of these articles called for the complete abolishment of the system 
as an anachronism and a mockery of civilization. All of the articles condemned 
the unconstitutional, bureaucratic and Germanizing system in the Military 
Frontier, and the arduous economic conditions endured by the population 
there. Some articles were actually polemics for or against the preservation of 
the Military Frontier system, but demands for the complete incorporation of 
the Military Frontier to Croatia proper were rare. Generally what was sought 
was the administrative attachment of the Military Frontier to Civil Croatia, 
i.e. the introduction of political freedoms in the Military Frontier and the 
jurisdiction of civilian institutions over its non-military population.4 On 
3  T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 58-64. Greater detail on Zagreb’s political newspapers in 
1848-1850 can be found in: P. Korunić, Jugoslavenska ideologija; T. Markus, Zagrebački politički 
listovi 1848.-1850. godine. Izabrani članci (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2005):11-64; V. 
Švoger, Zagrebačko liberalno novinstvo.
4  T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 61-64. In April and May 1848, several districts from the 
Croatian and Slavonian Military Frontier released their demands in which they generally sought 
the introduction of political and civic freedoms, and Croatian as the official language, separa-
tion of military from civilian administration, the quickest possible convocation of the Sabor, the 
incorporation of Dalmatia into Croatia, independence from Hungarian authority, the organiza-
tion of free military municipalities, economic reforms, etc. However, although the demand for 
Croatian territorial and national integration could not be achieved with the preservation of the 
Military Frontier, even if it were reformed and administratively integrated, its abolishment as a 
separate administrative and political unit was not sought because of the military and political 
threat to Croatia from Hungary, the impossibility of the immediate abolishment of a centuries-
old socio-administrative structure and the significance of this frontier zone to the Eastern Ques-
tion and the incorporation of the Military Frontier into Croatia proper, or, at a minimum, the 
introduction of political freedoms and constitutionality in it. Even so, as of January 1849, with 
clear indications of a looming Austrian reaction, the attacks by Zagreb newspapers against “mil-
itary-bureaucratic despotism” and “Germanism” in the Military Frontier resumed with much 
greater intensity, culminating after the declaration of the imposed constitution.
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March 25, 1848, the assembly of Zagreb citizens did not draft the “platform” of 
the Croatian Forty-eight, but the “People’s Demands” most clearly expressed 
some of the fundamental demands of the Croatian movement, from political 
autonomy and territorial unification, to economic and social reforms. In later 
periods, frequent demands, particularly widespread among the public, would 
include political ties with the Slovenian lands and Serbian Vojvodina, and the 
reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy into a (con)federal state with broad 
privileges for individual lands.
The conflict with the new Hungarian government, which had formal 
legitimacy, quickly became the greatest problem for the Croatian political 
movement. The Croatian elite could, unlike previously, no longer count on 
the limited assistance of the Viennese court, which had temporarily lost all 
influence in the Transleithan lands, except in units of the imperial army to a 
certain degree. In Croatian circles, individual Hungarian attempts to achieve 
Hungarian-Croatian cooperation were rejected as hypocritical while the 
Hungarians were persecuting the members of other peoples in Transleithania. 
Many documents pertaining to the Croatian movement of the time condemned, 
much more than previously, Magyarization policies and the imposition of the 
Hungarian language upon the Slovaks, Romanians and Serbs. The achievement 
of national equality and the restoration of political ties between Transleithania 
and the Austrian provinces were sought. In much correspondence from the 
Croatian districts directed to the king, respect for Croatian autonomy and the 
preservation of its independence from the new Hungarian government were 
demanded.5 The Croatian political movement, and this was its basic difference 
in relation to the Hungarian movement, condemned Hungarian separatism 
from the beginning and stressed the desire to remain within the framework of 
the Habsburg Monarchy. The reason behind this was not blind legitimacy, but 
rather the conviction that the Triune Kingdom was too weak for independent 
political existence. However, even the demands for broad state autonomy, 
albeit considerably more modest than Hungarian pretensions, would prove too 
excessive for centralist circles in Vienna. The pressure exerted by Hungarian 
nationalism indicated the necessity of organizing the political leadership of 
the Croatian movement. Here the most important institution was the person 
of the ban (viceroy and military commander), for the Triune Kingdom did 
not have a ban at the time, but rather just the ban regent: Zagreb Bishop Juraj 
Haulik. Both the Croatian elite and the Viennese court had an interest in the 
ban being a military officer who could oppose Hungarian separatism. At a 
secret state conference held on March 21-23, 1848, a colonel from the Military 
Frontier, Josip Jelačić, was appointed ban. This complied with the wishes of 
many Croatian politicians, for Jelačić was already known for his support to the 
Illyrian Movement, and he was esteemed not only as an imperial officer but also 
5  I. Iveljić, J. Kolanović and N. Stančić, Hrvatski državni sabor, 168-176, 178-180, 182-183, 200-
203, 205-221, 258-267.
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as a “man of the people.” After arriving in Croatia, Jelačić acted energetically: at 
the end of April 1848 he severed all official ties with the Hungarian government 
and refused to take orders from it; he proclaimed the abolishment of serfdom, 
declared the introduction of a court martial and removed the pro-Hungarian 
(“Magyarone”) elements from authority in Zagreb County. The Croatian public 
unanimously upheld Jelačić’s measures, seeing in them a defense of Croatian 
autonomy and the first steps toward achievement of basic national objectives. 
During March and April 1848, there were frequent attempts and proposals 
to find some modus vivendi with the Hungarians, but these rapidly gave way 
to an increasingly outright anti-Hungarian mood. Pro-Hungarian elements, 
adherents of the former “Croato-Ugric Party,” either emigrated, changed their 
political orientation or became politically passive.
In the course of April and May 1848, the most distinguished activists and 
politicians of the Croatian movement, Ljudevit Vukotinović, Ivan Mažuranić, 
Ivan Kukuljević, Bogoslav Šulek and others, refined the already established 
tenets of Croatian politics. They sought the preservation and enlargement of 
Croatian autonomy, a new alliance with Hungary based on political equality, 
an end to Magyarization and the establishment of national equality of all 
subject peoples in Hungary and so forth. As to the central issue – relations with 
Hungarians and the new Hungarian government – as of the latter half of April 
1848, the proposals ranged from the severance of administrative ties to efforts 
to recognize national equality in the lands of the Hungarian crown, but without 
cutting off all political relations.6 Nonetheless, all were unanimous in rejecting 
Hungarian political separatism and national hegemony over other peoples. In 
Croatia, an ally was sought among the non-Hungarian peoples in Hungary, 
first and foremost the Serbs. In the Serbian areas of Banat, Bačka and (Eastern) 
Syrmia, a powerful Serbian national movement emerged in the spring of 1848, 
which put forth the demand for the creation of an autonomous political unit: 
Serbian Vojvod(ov)ina, which would encompass most of Syrmia. The territorial 
question of Syrmia was at the time a secondary concern in comparison to the 
need for cooperation against the Hungarians as a common enemy. A Croatian 
delegation attended the Serbian national assembly in Sremski Karlovci in mid-
May 1848, while a Serbian delegation similarly attended the opening of the 
Croatian Sabor three weeks later in Zagreb. The Croatian public supported 
the aspirations of the Serbian movement for the creation of Vojvodina and the 
achievement of national equality, for then the Croats could also more easily 
achieve their aims. The Croatian and Serbian movements could not count on 
6   In the brochure “Někoja glavna pitanja našeg vremena” (“Some of the Main Issues of Our 
Time”), Ljudevit Vukotinović called for the severance of administrative ties with the Hungar-
ian government, albeit with the retention of the Croatian minister in it, while Ivan Mažuranić, 
in a contemporary brochure “Hèrvati Madjarom” (“The Croats to the Magyar”) proposed the 
maintenance of ties, but with the ending of Greater Hungarian policies and the recognition 
of Croatian independence and national equality. Both brochures were published in mid-April 
1848, but soon all ties with the Hungarian government would be severed.
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support from the Viennese court, particularly after the unrest in Vienna and 
the flight of the dynasty to Innsbruck. In the case of the Croats in particular, 
the Viennese court was playing a dual game, for it formally supported the 
Hungarian government and condemned Jelačić’s anti-Hungarian actions, but 
it did nothing to assist the actual implementation of Hungarian intentions. 
This became particularly apparent in the summer of 1848, when Jelačić was 
formally dismissed from the post of ban, while he was treated as the Croatian 
ban in Innsbruck and negotiated with the chief of the Hungarian government 
in this capacity. At the time, the dynasty could not openly proceed against the 
Hungarian movement and clearly proclaim its commitment to the restoration 
of the Empire’s unity.
In May 1848, the Ban’s Conference, composed of respected individuals of 
Croatia’s public life, drafted an instruction governing elections for the Sabor 
to which 192 deputies were elected based on indirect suffrage. Due to the 
relatively high electoral census, approximately 40,000 persons were entitled to 
vote, together with the virilists, who could attend by virtue of their function. 
The elections were held in the Military Frontier without the consent of the 
military authorities. Jelačić wanted to go to Innsbruck to justify himself before 
the king, but the more prominent members of the Ban’s Conference demanded 
that he first convene the Sabor, which would make the most important 
decisions concerning political and other matters. The Sabor sat, due to Jelačić’s 
departure for Innsbruck, in two separate periods, from June 5-12 and June 27-
July 10, 1848. In the first session, the Sabor made its most important political 
decisions: the ratification of all of Jelačić’s earlier decrees, the separation of 
the Triune Kingdom from Hungary and its unification with the Austrian 
constitutional provinces, the achievement of territorial integrity and an 
accountable government. Despite the desires of some deputies to preserve the 
alliance with Hungary, the vast majority of deputies supported sanctioning de 
facto severed ties and the political reorientation of the Triune Kingdom toward 
the Austrian provinces. A conclusion was also passed calling for the creation 
of a separate Croatian government or “state council” (“dèržavno vieće”). A 
political alliance between the Triune Kingdom and Serbian Vojvodina was also 
proclaimed, wherein the contested matter of Syrmia was ambiguously resolved. 
The desire for ties with the Slovenian provinces was also expressed.7 The Sabor 
issued a proclamation to the people of Dalmatia, calling on unification with 
Civil Croatia based on historical and ethnic bonds. The king was asked to 
cease deploying new frontier units outside of Croatia, for its defense – and this 
meant from the Hungarians – would be jeopardized.8
7   I. Iveljić, J. Kolanović and N. Stančić, Hrvatski državni sabor, 541-542, 544-545.
8   Croatian National Archives (hereinafter: HDA), Periodicals Collection (ZS) I., 1848., 131/59; 
Saborske novine, 20. VI. 1848/no. 7. On the Croatian Sabor, see: J. Šidak, Studije iz hrvatske 
povijesti za revolucije 1848-49; T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret; Ivo Perić, Hrvatski državni 
sabor 1848-1867. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest/Dom i svijet, 2000); Stančić, N. 2001a. 
“Hrvatski “dèržavni sabor” 1848. na razmeđu epoha i sukobljenih  legitimiteta” (I. Iveljić-J. 
Kolanović-N. Stančić, Hrvatski državni sabor) 29-63.
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The Sabor acknowledge financial, military and foreign affairs as common to 
all lands in the Monarchy, but only within the framework of the constitutional 
and parliamentary order and with due respect accorded to Croatian political 
and state autonomy. It did not seek the reorganization of the Habsburg 
Monarchy into a federation of equal states and peoples on an Austro-Slav basis, 
but this idea did appear in the Zagreb press at the time, particularly in articles 
by Bogoslav Šulek.9 Even though the idea of reorganizing Austria had already 
been mentioned in the Zagreb press in early April 1848, it was only with Šulek’s 
aforementioned articles printed in June of this same year that it was tied to the 
concept of Austro-Slavism and was given its first clear breakdown. As of June 
1848, Austro-Slavism appeared with increasing frequency in the Zagreb press 
and quickly became, particularly as of autumn of that same year and onward, 
one of its most frequent and important concepts, based on a link between federal 
values, i.e. acknowledgement of common (foreign, military and financial) 
affairs, and confederal values, i.e. significant independence of each constituent 
state and its genuine, inalienable sovereignty. The Austro-Slav concept had 
originally emerged in the Czech milieu, but the wider Croatian public had 
several reasons to accept it and to later – on the basis of independence exercised 
through the Ban’s Council – most consistently advocate it. This was a result, on 
the one hand, of the view that Croatia’s prospects for complete independence 
were unrealistic, and, on the other, the rejection of Hungarian dominance and 
the unconstitutional pre-March system. Joining the Austrian provinces, with 
the preservation of broad internal independence, would make it easier to unite 
the Croatian lands, particularly Dalmatia, the Military Frontier and the eastern 
districts of Istria, which were under the direct rule of the Vienna government. 
It was also believed that joining the better-developed Austrian provinces would 
facilitate the more rapid cultural and economic modernization of Croatian 
society. In this regard, the restoration of the pre-March order and the victory 
of reaction were not deemed possible, but this was not crucial to the actual idea 
of Austro-Slavism. Namely, the Croatian public remained committed to it even 
during 1849, while the opposition press persisted even thereafter, when the 
renewal of reaction and the predominance of conservative forces in the Court 
and the Austrian government had already been factually established. Given the 
prevailing circumstances, the Zagreb press considered Austro-Slavism the only 
more or less acceptable concept which could be accepted by the nationalists of 
the small Slavic peoples in Austria, including the Croats. But the reality was 
9    T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 129-130. The Croats has the status of a so-called histori-
cal people – which had its own state earlier – while the Austro-Slav concept was based, as with 
the Czech elite, largely on natural law. When expressing the narrower Croatian political aims, 
particularly in representations and memoranda to the ruler, the elements of both historic and 
natural law were employed, as was the case with the elites of other “historical peoples.” The 
same was attempted by the elites of those peoples, such as the Serbs, who had the status of a 
“non-historical people.” It would appear that there was a significant minority of deputies in the 
Croatian Sabor of 1848 which expressed apprehension over Croatia’s merger with Austria due t 
the possible renewal of reaction.
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different, for Polish nationalists were largely anti-Austrian, while the Slovene, 
Slovak and Serb nationalists generally limited their efforts to the creation of 
their own autonomous states within the framework of Austria or Hungary. 
Therefore, only the Czechs and Croats remained consistent advocates of the 
Austro-Slavism of 1848-1849.
The Croatian public believed that the Habsburg dynasty should be the 
principal factor in bringing the Austro-Slav concept to fruition, for most 
Austrian peoples were interested in the achievement of this end. Cooperation 
between the dynasty and the subjugated peoples of the Monarchy, the Slavs 
and Romanians, was supposed to break the resistance of the Germans and 
Hungarians and ensure the reorganization of Austria into a community of free 
and equal nations. It implied an essential change in the existing political, state, 
legal, social and cultural relations in the territory of Central and Southeast 
Europe and the development of new bonds of interest between the states and 
nations of the Danubian Basin. Noteworthy here is the essential difference 
in views between the Zagreb press and the official institutions of Croatian 
politics, such as the Sabor, Ban Jelačić and, later, the Ban’s Council concerning 
Austro-Slavism and the related the federalization/confederalization of Austria. 
Already in the spring of 1848, Czech nationalists generally endorsed Austro-
Slavism, for the official state institutions which conducted so-called real 
politics did not have, nor could distinguish between, a narrower national and 
broader platform. The situation in Croatia was different, as there were official 
state institutions, such as the Sabor, the ban, and later, the Ban’s Council, 
associated with diplomatic concerns. The Zagreb newspapers, particularly 
Novine dalmatinsko-hèrvatsko-slavonske and, somewhat later, Slavenski Jug 
and Südslawische Zeitung, did the most to promote the Croats as the most 
persistent advocates, together with the Czechs, of Austro-Slavism in Austria 
in 1848-1849. Prior to the end of the revolution, Croatian writers could 
much more freely advocate Austro-Slavism than the Czechs, for the Austrian 
government did not have control over internal affairs in Croatia, and they 
did not cease promoting it even after the complete victory of the reaction, at 
the end of 1849 and early 1850. Zagreb newspapers were able to present the 
idea of Austro-Slavism, for they were not tied down by diplomatic concerns 
and did not have to consider what, in the view of the time, could be achieved, 
like the narrower Croatian national aims (limited independence and Croatia’s 
territorial integrity), but rather what they wished to achieve, i.e. the Austro-
Slav reorganization of Austria. The stance of Croatia’s formal institutions was 
different, as they, first and foremost, had to take into account that politics is 
the art of the possible and, in this regard, promotes what could possibly be 
achieved rather than what was ideally desired. Thus the demands of Croatia’s 
institutions – from the Sabor of 1848, through the Ban’s Council and Ban 
Jelačić, to the Sabor’s Grand Committee in 1849 – pertain almost exclusively 
to Croatia’s narrower national objectives. Among the other demands, ties 
between Croatia and Serbian Vojvodina are generally mentioned, both because 
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it factually existed at the time of the civil war, and because of the difficulty 
of Vojvodina maintaining itself as a separate political entity in the long-term 
after the war. The most important demand of Croatian politics from the end of 
1848, when the first contacts between the Ban’s Council and the king since the 
close of the Sabor occurred, was the king’s sanction of the Sabor’s conclusions 
in which there is no mention of Austria’s reorganization on the Austro-Slav 
basis. It is very possible that Austro-Slavism was the aspiration of almost all 
Croatian politicians, including Ban Jelačić, but in their public actions this was 
not generally observable. Indeed, this was only logical, since Croatian politics 
did not manage to achieve even its minimum aims, i.e. autonomy and Croatia’s 
territorial integrity within the Monarchy. It was therefore pointless and doubly 
unrealistic to proffer demands for the Austro-Slav reorganization of Austria to 
the king and the Austrian government.
On June 12, 1848, the Sabor temporarily adjourned its session so that 
Ban Jeličić, heading a Sabor delegation, could go to the king in Innsbruck. 
Under pressure from the Hungarian government, the king issued manifestos 
whereby Jelačić was deposed from the ban’s seat and the Croatian-Slavonian 
districts were called upon to obey the commands of General Hrabowski. 
However, these were diplomatic tactics on the part of the Viennese court, 
for in Innsbruck Jelačić was de facto received as the ban and the members 
of the imperial family expressed their support for Croatian matters. Even so, 
the king, under the Hungarian government’s influence, treated the delegation 
as illegal and designated Archduke Johann as the mediator in Croatian-
Hungarian negotiations. Even though the Sabor’s requests were not accepted, 
the arrangement of negotiations indicated that the anti-ban manifestos were 
not applied against Jelačić and that they did not need to be taken seriously. 
Jelačić reinforced his position at the Court by sending a proclamation to the 
Military Frontier units in Italy, calling on them to preserve their fealty to the 
king and the ability of the Croats to defend their homeland without them.10 
The Sabor’s Steering Committee was active in Zagreb in the meantime under 
the chairmanship of Mirko Lentulaj, who attempted to stave off the growing 
Hungarian influence in Slavonia. The Committee maintained ties with the ban’s 
commissioners, particularly Albert Nugent, and with the Serbian Executive 
Committee, also attempting to deploy armed assistance to the Serbs against 
Hrabowski. The anti-ban manifestos aroused great dissatisfaction, but they 
were treated as the intrigues of the Hungarian government and did not spark 
any anti-Austrian tendencies.
On June 29, 1848, the Sabor resumed its session, and at the beginning 
it accorded dictatorial authority to Jelačić for the needs of defending the 
country, which the ban would later abuse on a number of occasions, usually 
in the interest of the Viennese reaction. The Sabor accepted the mediation 
10   Archives of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Science (AHAZU), Ban Jelačić Bequest (OBJ), 
III/H-3.
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of Archduke Johann, but prior to the beginning of negotiations it sought the 
revocation of the anti-ban manifestos, the recognition of the legality of the 
Sabor, the removal of Hungarian military units from Slavonia, the initiation of 
negotiations with representatives of Dalmatia and the Hungarian Serbs (with 
negotiations held at a neutral location), and the cessation of persecution of the 
Hungarian Slavs.11 In a remonstrance sent to the archduke, the Sabor stressed 
the untenability of Greater Hungarian policies, which were threatening the 
destruction of the Monarchy and negating the national rights of others, 
particularly the Slavic peoples.12 The Sabor committee’s proposal particularly 
insisted on the centralization of basic (foreign, military and financial) affairs 
within the framework of the central constitutional institutions in Vienna, the 
cessation of persecution of the non-Hungarian peoples and the independence of 
the Triune Kingdom and Serbian Vojvodina from the Hungarian government.13 
However, the Sabor’s deputies had little hope that the future negotiations would 
conclude successfully, as seen in the sharp anti-Hungarian proclamations 
assailing the Hungarian government and its policies which were issued to the 
people on July 6, 1848.14 The Sabor issued measures to implement economic 
and social reforms in the Military Frontier, jointly designated the “frontier 
constitution.” Their objective was to ease the life of Frontier troops, abolish 
the worst feudal abuses, gradually introduce Croatian as the official language, 
etc.15 The majority of deputies, particularly those from the Frontier regiments, 
supported radical measures, i.e. the attachment of the Military Frontier to 
the Triune Kingdom, but given the difficult political circumstances, gradual 
changes were accepted. Most frontier deputies protested against the Sabor”s 
reformism, deeming it insufficient to eliminate the great dissatisfaction in the 
Military Frontier over the old bureaucratic order, but with the exception of the 
brief insubordinate activities of Dimitrije Orelj, they equanimously accepted 
the majority’s decision.16 The Sabor issued a proclamation to the population 
of the Military Frontier, calling upon them to adhere to the ban’s orders and 
not to give credence to Hungarian propaganda.17 In a remonstrance to the 
king, the Sabor emphasized the need for the constitutional restructuring of 
the Military Frontier and its reintegration with its mother country as soon as 
11   I. Iveljić, J. Kolanović and N. Stančić, Hrvatski državni sabor, 552-553. The Croatian-Hungar-
ian negotiations were later held without any regard to the Sabor’s demands.
12   Novine dalmatinsko-hèrvatsko-slavonske, 6 July 1848, no. 70.
13   I. Iveljić, J. Kolanović and N. Stančić, Hrvatski državni sabor, 553-554.
14   HDA, ZS I., 1848/131-84.
15   I. Iveljić, J. Kolanović and N. Stančić, Hrvatski državni sabor: 555-570. On political circum-
stances in the Military Frontier, cf.: Mirko Valentić, Vojna krajina i pitanje njezina sjedinjenja 
s Hrvatskom 1849-1881. (Zagreb: Zavod za hrvatsku povijest, 1981);  Alexander Buczynski, 
“Trojna zapovjedna podređenost Vojne krajine 1848. godine”, in: M. Valentić, ed., Hrvatska 
1848. i 1849. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2001): 123-134.
16   HDA, Sabor Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije, box 2, 1848/11-2.
17   AHAZU, OBJ, III/H-4.
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possible, and the need for its independence from the Hungarian government.18 
The Sabor ratified Jelačić’s decree on the abolishment of peasant levies, which 
granted unrestricted peasant rights to use of rural lands with damages paid 
to the nobility and clergy for the elimination of urbarial levies.19 Prior to the 
closure of its session, the Sabor issued a proclamation to the European peoples 
entitled “Manifesto of the Croatian-Slavonian People,” in which it stressed 
that the basic aspiration of the Croats is to be a free people in a free Austrian 
empire. The fundamental condition for this was the removal of Hungarian 
and German hegemony over Slavic and other peoples and the achievement of 
political autonomy for each people in their ethnic territory. Given the European 
liberal public’s sympathies for the Hungarians, the manifesto particularly 
condemned Greater Hungarian policies, which aroused the resistance of all 
other peoples, particularly the Croats, who were only defending their earlier 
autonomy. The manifesto briefly – and this is the only such instance in a formal 
document issued by any official Croatian institution – stresses the need for the 
reorganization of Austria into a pluralist alliance of states of equal peoples.20 
Due to the precarious political and military circumstances, the Sabor formally 
decided to adjourn and ceased its work on July 9, 1848, although it never again 
sat in the same convocation.
After the conclusion of the Sabor’s sessions, Jelačić visited Slavonia in 
July 1848 and attempted to reinforce the his authority as ban. However, he 
confronted many difficulties, from the strong Hungarian influence, particularly 
in the northern sections of Virovitica County, to the Serbian movement in 
Syrmia, which had replaced the previous county governing institutions with 
people’s committees under the control of the Executive Committee. At the end 
of July 1848, negotiations were held in Vienna between Jelačić and Hungarian 
Prime Minister L. Batthyány, mediated by Archduke Johann. The talks ended 
without success, because the Hungarian side did not wish to accept joint 
affairs for the entire Monarchy, i.e. it did not wish to back down from the 
virtual independence of its country. The Hungarians also refused to accept 
the recognition of Serbian Vojvodina. In these negotiations, Jelačić abused his 
dictatorial authority the first time, as he passed over the remaining conditions 
put forth by the Sabor for these talks. In a proclamation to the Croatian 
public issued on August 6, 1848, Jelačić stressed that he had sought from 
the Hungarians the recognition of joint affairs, the recognition of Vojvodina 
and the unrestricted use of the Croatian language in communications with 
the Hungarian authorities.21 On the same day, Jelačić also announced the 
18  National and University Library (NSK), Manuscript Collection (ZR), Flier/Brochure Collec-
tion (ZL), Hrvatski sabor II., R VIIIa B-2.
19  For more details on the peasant issue in Civil Croatia and Slavonia at that time, cf.: J. Šidak, 
Studije iz hrvatske povijest za revolucije 1848-49., 145-174.
20  NSK, ZR, ZL, Razne stranke I (Various Parties), R VIIIa B-2.
21   AHAZU, OBJ, III/H-7.
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“dispensations” for the Military Frontier, which were more specifically economic 
reforms, while the introduction of the national language as the official language 
and the administrative unification of the Military Frontier with Croatia proper 
were left for later sanction by the king.22 At the end of July 1848, a Croatian 
delegation visited Vienna, but the Austrian parliament refused to receive it, 
for it had come from another state, i.e. Hungary. The delegation addressed the 
Austrian people with a proclamation, “Die Kroaten und Slawonier an die Völker 
Oesterreichs” (basically a German translation of the Sabor’s “Manifesto”), in 
which Hungarian hegemonic policies were berated and the desire of the Croats 
to be a free people in a free Austrian empire was underscored.23 At that time, 
a new political newspaper was launched in Zagreb under the name Slavenski 
Jug, which from the very beginning advocated the Austro-Slav reorganization 
of the Habsburg Monarchy, the equality of the Hungarian peoples, cooperation 
between the Croats and other Slavic and South Slav peoples, and the autonomy 
and territorial integrity of the Triune Kingdom inside the Monarchy. The Zagreb 
press expressed doubt in Croatian-Hungarian reconciliation prior to the talks 
between Jelačić and Batthyány in Vienna at the end of July 1848, and after their 
failure, for which the Hungarians were naturally blamed, anti-Hungarian texts 
only increased. The Hungarians were criticized, as before, for their aspiration 
to institute national hegemony over Transleithania, their violence against 
non-Hungarian peoples, particularly the Serbs (a Hungarian-Serbian war was 
already under way in Bačka and Banat), their efforts to politically subjugate 
Croatia, their separation from the Habsburg Monarchy and their mendacity in 
political negotiations.24
During August 1848, Croatian-Hungarian relations continued to worsen, 
both due to Hungarian efforts to increase their influence in individual parts of 
Slavonia, and the increasingly fierce battles and brutality on the Hungarian-
Serbian front. The Austrian victory in Northern Italy over Piedmont reinforced 
the imperial position and paved the way for Jelačić’s intervention against 
the Hungarian government. Jelačić reinforced the ban’s authority in Eastern 
Slavonia, except for the larger part of Syrmia, which was still under the control 
of the Serbian movement. In early September, the king voided the anti-ban 
manifestos and restored all of Jelačić authority. Jelačić received encouragement 
to initiate an intervention from circles close to the imperial court. The purpose 
of this intervention was the destruction of Hungarian independence and the 
restoration of the integrity of the Habsburg Monarchy. Such an intervention 
was primarily an interest of the Viennese court, but many – and not just among 
the Croats – believed it could be exploited to secure national equality. The 
intervention was supported by the Croatian public, seeing it as advantageous to 
22   AHAZU, Ferdo Šišić Bequest , XIII B 231/342.
23   NSK, ZR, ZL, Inozemni plakati (Foreign Posters), R VIIIa I-3. For more details on the Sabor”s 
delegation, see: J. Šidak, Studije iz hrvatske povijesti za revolucije 1848-49, 175-195.
24   T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 176-179.
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non-Hungarian peoples. In a proclamation to the people issued on September 
7, 1848, Jelačić justified the intervention on the basis Hungary’s insistence on 
political separatism, particularly from joint affairs for the entire Monarchy, 
and the rejection of national equality, particularly where this concerned 
Serbian demands.25 At the end of August 1848, at Jelačić’s behest, the deputy 
prefect of Zagreb County, Josip Bunjevac, occupied Rijeka, in which a pro-
Hungarian orientation predominated at the time. Prior to departing for the 
war, Jelačić issued the regulation on organization of the Ban’s Council, not as 
an informal government, but rather as an administrative institution answerable 
to him personally. The Ban’s Council consisted of judicial, financial, domestic 
affairs, educational and military sections, and it also exercised administrative 
authority over the lower administrative agencies in the territory of Civil 
Croatia and Slavonia, with the exception of most of Syrmia, in which authority 
was factually exercised by the Serbian People’s Executive Committee. The Ban’s 
Council did not enjoy the status of an actual government, for it had to refer 
to the ban to resolve even the most trivial issue. However, later, during 1849, 
many Croats saw in it the basis upon which a genuine national government 
answerable to the Sabor should be formed.
Jelačić”s crossing of the Drava River was lauded by the Croatian public, 
considering this an essential means to achieve their basic national aims.26 
However, this intervention was primarily in Austria’s interest and it signified 
a great leap into the unknown. The exponents of Croatian politics had no 
guarantees, neither from the king nor the Austrian government, that the 
demands of the Croatian political movement, formulated by the Sabor, and 
especially autonomy and the Triune Kingdom’s territorial integrity, would be 
conceded. As to the demand for national equality, it would be demonstrated that 
this could exist even under the conditions of an unconstitutional bureaucratic 
order, which represses all peoples equally. The demands for the Austro-
Slav reorganization of the Monarchy often aired on the Croatian political 
scene appeared even less realistic. However, at the time it was generally felt 
that the most important matter was to remove the independent Hungarian 
government by armed intervention and restore the unity of the Monarchy. The 
tenacity of conservative forces in Austria around the dynasty and the imperial 
army, uninterested in the constitutional order and the acknowledgement 
of national aspirations, was underestimated. The military value of Jelačić’s 
detachments was minor, for these were generally units of the second and third 
order, inadequately armed and only slightly better fed. Even with very light 
resistance mounted by the Hungarians, Jelačić could not break through to 
Budapest and, upon receiving news of a new revolution in Vienna, marched 
westward to the Austrian provinces. In his proclamations issued at the end of 
September 1848, the king condemned the separatism of Hungarian politics 
25   AHAZU, OBJ, III/B-42.
26   T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 185-189.
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and the persecution of the non-Hungarian peoples in Hungary, stressing the 
need for the restored unity of the Empire. At the end of October 1848, the king 
dissolved the Hungarian parliament, voided all of its unsanctioned conclusions 
and appointed Jelačić the royal commissioner and commander of the imperial 
troops in Hungary and Transylvania (Erdély). However, these provisions were 
never implemented, because the Hungarian parliament, even though truncated, 
continued its work, and Jelačić soon lost his post as commissioner.
Croatia’s political life came to a standstill after Jelačić’s march to war, for 
the public was entirely preoccupied by the military campaign. However, the 
new revolution in Vienna in 1848, which prompted the renewed flight of the 
imperial family, captured the attention of the Croatian public. The revolution 
was condemned as the result of political intrigues by German nationalists and 
Hungarian separatists, who did not recognize the principle of national equality 
and free development of all peoples in a unified Austria. The revolution was 
interpreted as a consequence of efforts to maintain German and Hungarian 
domination over the Slavic peoples in Austria and Hungary and as a diversion 
intended to confound Jelačić’s occupation of Budapest. Even though the 
forceful suppression of the revolution, in which Jelačić’s troops participated, 
was generally approved, individual shootings and the declaration of a state of 
emergency were criticized.27 As a consequence of the Vienna Revolution, the 
ban regent Mirko Lentulaj issued an order to all districts to ban the return of 
pro-Hungarian émigrés, monitor all suspect individuals and introduce a court 
martial against all rebels.28 A month later Ban Jelačić, in response to news 
of peasant unrest in Zagreb County, issued a proclamation to the peasants 
of Croatia and Slavonia, in which he reiterated the Sabor’s decision on the 
abolishment of urbarial levies and use of rural lands.29 The uncertain situation 
in the countryside also contributed to Jelačić’s decision of October 1848 to 
initiate recruitment for the regular army, which was conducted slowly and 
with great difficulty.
During the Vienna Revolution, the threat of renewed Austrian reaction 
was not generally perceived among the Croatian public. This would change 
by November 1848. The king’s proclamation to the peoples of the Hungarian 
crown issued on November 6, 1848, whereby the conservative general, Prince 
Windischgrätz, was appointed the supreme commander of the imperial and 
royal troops in Hungary, already created an unsavory impression among the 
Croatian public. This constituted a tacit annulment of the king’s proclamation 
of October 1848, and Jelačić was stripped of his command as imperial general; 
27   J. Šidak, 1979:249-289; T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 192-198. The Zagreb press did not 
endorse the initiative of Zagreb County’s Steering Committee which, prompted by the Vienna 
revolution, first sought from the Ban’s Council the organization of a Slavic congress and then, in 
early November 1848, the deployment of a Croatian delegation to the Austrian parliament.
28  HDA, Banska pisma (Ban’s Correspondence), box CLII., 1848/104c.
29  HDA, ZS I., 1848/131-68.
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he had already become loathed among a part of the Slavic public due to the 
bombardment of Prague and the dissolution of the Slavic Congress in June 
1848. Croatian writers stressed that Jelačić did not deserve such treatment 
and turned attention to the fact that the king’s proclamation was not co-
signed by the relevant minister, which was customary under constitutional 
procedure. Even more consternation was aroused by the appointment of a new 
government headed by Count Franz Stadion and Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, 
traditionally-minded politicians known for their conservatism. The new 
government, which was not parliamentary, rather appointed by the emperor 
at the proposal of court and military circles, set as its fundamental objective 
the restoration of the Monarchy”s unity, which meant crushing the Hungarian 
revolution. Individual Croatian political activists warned that all members of 
the new government were ethnically German, with no knowledge of Slavic 
languages and generally proponents of a centralized order in which there was 
no place for Austro-Slav (con)federalism.30 At this time, as before and after, 
Austro-Slavism remained one of the basic orientations in Croatian public 
opinion. Even so, a lone opinion did appear, written by an anonymous author, 
who believed that a quick collapse would be the best for Austria, because 
it could not be maintained solely on the basis of national conflicts. Within 
Austria, national problems could not be resolved, but only suppressed, and 
such an Austria would be a constant threat to European peace.31 Even though 
this article elicited a sharp response in Vienna, and Jelačić demanded the 
enactment of a press law, it passed without consequences.
In November 1848, Croatian politics at the official level did not respond to 
the first clear signs of growing Austrian reaction. In December 1848, the royal 
and imperial Austrian army’s intervention against the independent Hungarian 
government began, and it was initially successful, for by January 1849 Budapest 
was taken without significant struggles, while the Hungarian army, then still 
poorly organized, crossed the Tisza. By the end of November 1848, there was 
a temporary abeyance in Croatia’s negative mood toward official Austrian 
policies. This was influenced by Schwarzenberg’s speech in the Austrian 
parliament, which included several pleasing turns of phrase on respect for 
constitutionality and parliamentarism, and changes on the throne, for it was 
believed that a new ruler would not be tied by pledges to preserve Hungarian 
domination, as well as individual minor concessions by the Court to the 
Croatian and Serbian movements, such as appointing Jelačić the administrator 
of Dalmatia and Rijeka, the appointment of Rajačić as patriarch of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and General Stefan Šupljikac as the Serbian duke. While the 
30  T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 207-215.
31  T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 221-223. This article (under the headline “Obzor austri-
jski”), with an explicitly anti-Austrian tone, was an exception in the entirety of Zagreb’s press 
during the revolutions of 1848-1849 and it cannot be interpreted as an expression of change in 
the basic standpoints of the paper in which it appeared, and particularly not the Croatian public 
in general.
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Hungarian public and political circles refused to recognize the new ruler, for 
he was not crowned in the Hungarian parliament house, the Croatian public 
welcomed the change on the throne. The general belief was that the previous 
king was bound by oath to uphold Hungarian hegemony in the countries of 
Transleithania, while the new ruler would work unimpeded on the achievement 
of the national equality which was so pompously proclaimed by the Vienna 
government. This notion was tied to the idea of Austro-Slavism so favored by 
Zagreb”s newspapers, for implementation of the principles of national equality 
in the lands of the Hungarian crown was perceived only as the beginning of 
the transformation of Austria in an Austro-Slav and “federalist” spirit.32 In 
this optimistic atmosphere, the idea once more emerged of sending Croatian 
delegates to the Austrian parliament, something advocated in particular by 
Slavenski Jug, but also, albeit somewhat more cautiously, by the remaining 
newspapers in Zagreb, in the belief that this act would strengthen the position 
of Slavic deputies in parliament, foment stronger ties between Croatia and 
the Austrian provinces, enhance the development of political life in Croatia 
and allow the Croats to determine the form of their ties with Austria on their 
own.33 At that time, at the end of November 1848, a society was established 
in Zagreb, called “Slavenska Lipa na slavenskom Jugu” (“Slavic Linden in the 
Slavic South”), which gathered a number of distinguished personalities in the 
public life of Croatia and Slavonia: Bogoslav Šulek, Ivan Kukuljević, Dragutin 
Kušlan, Nikola Krestić, Maksim Prica, Slavoljub Vrbančić and others. The 
society, established along the lines of a similar Czech society, was committed 
to the Austro-Slav and federalist reorganization of the Monarchy, national 
equality, educational and economic development, political democratization and 
cooperation between the Croats and other Slavic and South Slav peoples.34
The Croatian public saluted the change on the throne when Ferdinand 
was succeeded by Francis Joseph. It was believed that the new ruler, although 
he did not ascend to the throne constitutionally, could more easily achieve 
national equality in the countries of the Hungarian crown and aid the political 
consolidation and reorganization of the Monarchy. However, the Ban’s Council, 
although it sympathized with the efforts to send deputies to the Austrian 
parliament, did not wish to become involved in risky political ventures, nor 
could it do so without Jelačić’s consent. The official representatives of Croatian 
politics at the time felt that they first had to successful conclude military 
operations in Hungary and only then begin resolving the principal and other 
issues. Nonetheless, the Ban’s Council forwarded a memorandum to the king in 
late December 1848 in which it highlighted the criteria for linking the Triune 
32   T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 227-234.
33   T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 230-233.
34   NSK, Pisma i zapisnici Slavenske Lipe (Letters and Minutes of Slavenska Lipa), R 6524/a-1. 
On the activities of the Croatian “Lipa,” see: J. Šidak, Studije iz hrvatske povijesti za revolucije 
1848-49, 291-321.
Review of Croatian History 5/2009, no.1, 13 - 45
29
Kingdom to the Austrian provinces based on the conclusions of the Sabor of 
1848. The independence of Austria from the German Confederation  and the 
equality of peoples, as well as fulfillment of the political demands of the Croats 
and Vojvodina Serbs, were all stressed in the memorandum.35 In Croatia, the 
public also welcomed the king’s appointment of Jelačić as administrator of 
Dalmatia and Rijeka, which, although only formal in nature, was perceived as 
the way toward unification of the Croatian lands.
Croatia’s political movement, formal institutions and public opinion 
supported the preservation of the Habsburg Monarchy based on joint affairs 
and central institutions, but solely and exclusively on the basis of respect 
for Croatia’s state autonomy and territorial integrity. The new king and the 
Austrian government, however, attempted to restore not only the Empire’s 
unity, but also implement a centralized structure which, as opposed to the pre-
March system, would fully extend over the lands of Transleithania, including 
the Triune Kingdom. The Hungarian revolt was seen as a welcome excuse, 
for with it the Hungarian “gambled away” their historical rights. The other 
peoples of Transleithania were not even considered, because, like the Croats, 
they were too weak a political factor, or because, besides this weakness, they 
were “non-historical peoples” like the Serbs, Slovaks and Romanians. In a 
centralized empire, the official language of all governmental institutions, 
except for those in local municipalities, would be German, which in practice 
meant the extension of the German language to the lands of Transleithania, 
where until then Latin (earlier) or, more recently, Hungarian and Croatian 
had been used. This policy came to the fore quite early when, in December 
1848, the Vienna government sent notification to the Ban’s Council on the 
change on the throne and the manifesto of the new ruler only in the German 
language. A number of Croatian districts expressed bitterness over this act, 
and asked the Ban’s Council to intervene with the king and seek protection of 
the Croatian nationality and language.36 The ban regent, Lentulaj, asked the 
Croatian representative at the Court, Baron Kulmer, and the king to refrain 
from sending correspondence in German in the future, but rather to send and 
receive correspondence in Croatian in order to confirm in practice the equality 
of peoples.37
In the first weeks of 1849, as military operations in Hungary proceeded 
successfully, an optimistic mood could still frequently be found among the 
Croatian public. The Zagreb press, including the newly-launched Südslawische 
Zeitung, wrote that the fundamental Croatian objectives had not yet been 
35  Agramer Zeitung, 2 Jan. 1849, no. 1.
36  HDA, Ban’s Council (BV), Steering Committee (UO), box III, 1848/787, 789, box IV, 1848/148, 
357, 372, 373, 374.
37  HDA, BV, UO, III, 1848/787, IV, 1849/7. This intervention yielded no great benefit, for the 
Austrian government continued to send occasional correspondence in German, and this, after 
September 1849, became the customary practice.
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met, but that this could be expected in the future. Confidence was expressed 
in the work of the Austrian parliament, which was supposed to ensure 
constitutionality and national equality and ease the subsequent attachment of 
the Triune Kingdom to the Austrian provinces. The conviction was expressed 
that there can be no strengthening of unconstitutional forces and that the 
fundamental achievements of the revolution were secure.38 However, it would 
soon become clear just how mistaken such assessments were. On the floor of 
the Austrian parliament, the Austrian government called for the central role 
of the king in adopting the constitution, counter to the principles of national 
sovereignty. This was an additional burden to this parliament”s work, as it was 
torn by frequent national conflicts and linguistic difficulties, for many deputies 
did not have sound knowledge of German. In the occupied regions of Hungary, 
military commanders, with the approval of official circles in Vienna, appointed 
Hungarian conservatives as administrators, even in counties inhabited by non-
Hungarian populations. These Hungarian conservatives were pro-Habsburg, 
but no less intolerant of other peoples and supportive of Hungarian supremacy 
over them. Besides the German correspondence from the Vienna government, 
Hungarian correspondence began to arrive in Croatia from individual 
Hungarian institutions. These were additional reasons for the even greater 
Croatian dissatisfaction with Austrian policies and grounds for a gradual move 
to the opposition. During January and February 1849, criticism of the Austrian 
government began to appear increasingly in Zagreb’s newspapers, wherein its 
Germanizing, centralizing and, in individual areas of Hungary, pro-Hungarian 
policies were mostly emphasized. Increasing anxiety began to be expressed over 
the achievement of even the narrowest Croatian political aims, particularly 
state autonomy. The question of the Military Frontier had already become a 
subsidiary concern for the Croatian public earlier, hoping for the acceptance of 
the Sabor’s conclusions. However, now criticism was increasingly aimed at the 
old bureaucratic and semi-feudal system, which was not significantly altered 
by Jelačić’s “dispensations.” All initiatives meant to send Croatian deputies to 
the Austrian parliament disappeared entirely.
In the final months of 1848, sporadic criticisms on official Austrian policies 
appeared in the Zagreb press, but these pertained less to the existing situation 
than to the general duplicity and unfairness of Austrian policies in the past, 
particularly toward the “ever loyal” Slavic peoples. Even though such charges 
were frequent in November 1848, they still did not represent the fundamental 
and long-term orientation of the Zagreb press, i.e. their opposition standpoint. 
The prevailing view was that the basic accomplishments of the revolution – 
constitutionality, parliamentarism, and press freedom – were secure and that 
the Slavic peoples now had to win the corresponding reorganization of the 
Monarchy to meet their interests, on Austro-Slav foundations if possible, and 
certainly full national equality with the Germans and the Hungarians. It is 
38  T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 245-248.
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notable that Slavenski Jug, certainly the most radical of the Zagreb papers, was 
in fact the greatest and, actually, sole genuine advocate of sending Croatian 
deputies to Austria”s parliament in December 1848. However, in January and 
February 1849, increasingly frequent denunciations of the Austrian government 
began to appear, with accusations of its reactionary and centralist orientation. 
In the political terminology of the Zagreb press, “centralism” indicated the 
efforts of the core in Vienna to transform the Habsburg Monarchy into a 
modern centralized state modeled after France, with an internal division into 
precincts or, at the broadest, provinces or crown lands, which would possess 
absolutely no internal self-government. The glue holding such a state together 
would be a subservient bureaucracy and military, with German as the official 
language – except for retention of the Italian language as official in Lombardy, 
Istria and Dalmatia. This centralized monarchy would, according to the 
views of official circles in Austria, facilitate a dominant position for Austria 
in the German Confederation and accord it the status of a European great 
power. Such efforts would not constitute a novelty for the inherited Austrian 
provinces, for this existed as the established political order even prior to 
the revolution. However, the lands of Transleithania, Croatia, Hungary and 
Transylvania, had traditional, if only limited, self-government and a separate 
language of government (Latin, or Hungarian and Croatian). The members of 
the Croatian political movement were particularly sensitive to such efforts, for 
they not only retained their loyalty to the dynasty and the Monarchy, they had 
also, according to a very widespread although somewhat exaggerated opinion, 
saved the state in the turbulent events of 1848. The centralist orientation of 
the government was not only irreconcilable with the primary objective of the 
Croatian movement since the onset of the revolution, i.e. the broadest possible 
internal independence of a territorially unified Croatia, but it also jeopardized 
even the limited self-government which Civil Croatia exercised prior to 1848. 
Great consternation was also aroused by the maintenance of the old system in 
the Military Frontier, dominated by the imperial bureaucracy, with German as 
the official languages and a lack of constitutionality and political liberties. Such 
a situation also held in the latter half of 1848, but at the time the Zagreb press 
avoided attacks on the still surviving Frontier system, hoping that, as often 
stressed, the victory of the Austro-Slav concept in the near future and the end 
of the war in Croatia’s interest would result in the easy abolishment of “military 
despotism” in the Military Frontier and its incorporation into Croatia at large. 
The Croatian public’s move to opposition was caused by certain other factors 
as well, such as the Vienna government”s open support, announced on the 
floor of the Austrian parliament, for hereditary monarchism and monarchic 
“absolutism,” against the “democratic” principle of national sovereignty. It 
thereby demonstrated not only its opposition to the strivings of individual 
national movements (including, to be sure, Croatia’s) for the broadest possible 
national self-government and even limited independence, but also the 
intention of confronting the political freedoms that were the only palpable 
achievement of the revolution. Forcing the German language on non-German 
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lands in contacts with the highest administrative institutions, which included 
the Ban’s Council in Croatia, and assisting Hungarian conservatives in those 
Hungarian areas occupied by the imperial army demonstrated, according to 
the justified conviction of the Zagreb press, that not even the publicly accepted 
principle of national equality was being respected. The Zagreb press responded 
particularly negatively to the favor bestowed upon Hungarian conservative 
magnates, which was interpreted as an expression of the government’s 
reactionary orientation and ingratitude toward the Slavic peoples. Even the 
Vienna government’s aspiration to retain Austria’s dominant position in the 
German Confederation provoked the disapprobation of Zagreb’s newspapers, 
for they believed that the Austro-Slav and federalist reorganization of Austria 
would leave its sufficiently strong domestically to obviate the need for outside 
support, particularly from Germany, because this could reinforce the desire of 
the German-speakers to dominate all other peoples. All of this brought about 
a radical sea change among the Croatian public, for it had become clear that 
not only were political freedoms and the idea of Austro-Slavism in peril, but 
also the minimum Croatian national program, i.e. Croatia’s territorial integrity 
and limited independence. Under such circumstances, the attacks on official 
Austrian policies, with Slavenski Jug in the forefront, followed by other papers 
to a lesser extent, were no longer a sporadic and marginal phenomenon, but 
rather something essentially new, i.e. they indicated the Croatian public’s 
gradual move toward opposition to the Vienna government.39
The military successes in Hungary, when it appeared that the Hungarian 
revolution was at its last gasp, encouraged the emperor and military circles to 
compel the parliament to proclaim the imposed Constitution of March 1849. 
This act was justified by the national conflicts in parliament and the need for 
political unity in the Monarchy. According to the Constitution, the emperor 
was the center of political authority with key privileges, while parliament was 
sidelined, and the entire empire was divided into crown lands. Joint affairs 
not only included foreign, financial and military affairs, but other essential 
political and economic functions as well, insofar as they were not relegated to 
the provincial assemblies. According to this Constitution, the Monarchy was 
supposed to become a unitary empire in which there would no longer be any 
differentiation between the Austrian and Hungarian portions, even though the 
provincial borders were retained. The Triune Kingdom was also degraded to a 
crown land, which did not even comply with the limited provincial autonomy 
exercised prior to 1848, and particularly not with the broad state autonomy 
sought by the Croatian Sabor of 1848. Besides some formal promises, nothing 
specific was stated about the future status of Dalmatia, the Military Frontier and 
Serbian Vojvodina. The Croatian public bitterly condemned the Constitution, 
for it generally contradicted all of the fundamental aims of Croatian politics 
and even some of its positive aspects – proclamation of national equality, 
39  T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 249-26.
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elimination of class inequality, abolishment of serfdom and so forth – were 
only deemed formal and ancillary. The basic complaints pertained to the 
disrespect for parliamentary procedure, and the fact that it paved the way for 
absolutism, imposed centralization and Germanization, ignored the political 
autonomy of individual regions (especially the Transleithan lands), etc. In 
some articles, it was acknowledged that the Constitution had positive aspects 
as well, particularly where this pertained to administrative and political 
modernization, but this could not compensate for its shortcomings from the 
standpoint of the Croatian movement’s fundamental objectives.40 The Ban’s 
Council refused to promulgate the Constitution in the territory of Civil Croatia 
and Slavonia, and voided individual decisions based on its proclamation, such 
as the case of Bunjevac and Rijeka, but it could not prevent its proclamation in 
the territory of the Military Frontier. The failure of the Austrian army, which 
included Jelačić’s detachments, were interpreted by the press in Zagreb as a 
consequence of the imposed Constitution, the failure to observe the principle 
of national equality, particularly the imposition of the German language and, 
in Hungary, the Hungarian magnates.41
There were many reasons for the Croatian public’s displeasure with 
the Constitution, but most rested on the question of territorial integrity. 
According to it, the Military Frontier had to remain, as earlier, politically 
and administratively detached from Croatia proper, while the question of 
unification with Dalmatia was left for later negotiations which, as could be 
expected, remained an empty pledge. At this point, something more can be 
said about the question of territorial integrity in Croatian politics and among 
the politically-aware public during the revolution of 1848-1849. At the time, 
the level of Croatian national and territorial integration was still quite low, and 
specific regional traits were still very prominent. The Croatian name spread 
slowly in political circles, and it was often avoided due to fears that it would 
be associated with Croatia’s three northwestern counties. In September 1848, 
Jelačić occupied Međimurje and appointed a ban regent, who attempted to 
implement the orders of the Ban’s Council. He encountered great problems 
here, both due to the pro-Magyar mood of a portion of the intelligentsia, 
and due to the Austrian military authorities, which treated Međimurje as a 
part of Hungary, i.e. as an occupied territory. The remaining attempts of the 
Ban’s Council to annex Međimurje to Croatia already during the war were 
unsuccessful. This goal was temporarily accomplished only at the end of 1849, 
but the territory was again lost in 1861. Official circles in Croatia treated 
Syrmia as a component of the Triune Kingdom, even though it was already 
under the control of the Serbian movement. The Sabor’s conclusion on the 
cession of Syrmia to Vojvodina could not be carried forward, both due to the 
ambiguous political situation and the impossibility of linking Vojvodina with 
40  T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 269-278.
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the Triune Kingdom. Ban Jelačić opposed changing the status of Međimurje 
and Syrmia as long as the war continued. The possibility of Baranja belonging 
to Civil Croatia was not even mentioned among the Croatian public at the 
time, although Jelačić, in a memorandum submitted to the king in April 1849, 
sought this territory for Croatia as compensation for Syrmia, which would 
be joined to Serbian Vojvodina. The sub-prefect of Zagreb, Josip Bunjevac, 
occupied Rijeka at the end of August 1848, whose administrative magistracy 
was pro-Hungarian, and he implemented a modicum of control until the 
end of the war. The most important territorial problems were associated with 
Dalmatia and the Military Frontier, which remained separate from Civil 
Croatia and Slavonia until the end of the war and even afterward. The need 
for their annexation, particularly the Military Frontier, was repeatedly stated 
in documents issued by official institutions and by the wider public. Dalmatia 
was much less present in the Zagreb press not only at the beginning of the 
revolution, but also later, which was due not only to its greater distance and 
much lower readership of Zagreb periodicals there, but also due to the great 
significance of the Military Frontier to the Croatian political movement, 
particularly for the military defense of Croatia’s political independence from 
the Hungarian government. Not even official Croatian political institutions 
accorded significant attention to Dalmatia, except during the session of the 
Sabor, for it was focused on the defense of Croatia’s statehood, primarily from 
the Hungarian movement and then, as of the end of 1848, from the forces of 
reaction in Vienna. Istria was very rarely mentioned by the Croatian public, 
and generally in several brief reports which emphasized its Croatian ethnic 
majority. Istria’s eastern districts were an exception, as they were generally 
considered a part of the Croatian state in previous centuries, whose annexation 
was sought together with the Kvarner (Quarnero) islands already in the first 
Demands of the Croatian movement issued in March 1848.42
Prior to the enactment of the Constitution there were no texts in the Zagreb 
press praising the old Croatian constitution, for Croatian writers, generally 
members of the bourgeois intelligentsia, were aware that this was a formulation 
of obsolete feudal-aristocratic municipal rights, which had to be rescinded 
as soon as possible and replaced with a modern civic order. Texts dealing 
with the need for modernization of Croatian society, particularly where this 
concerned public schooling and systematic popular education, were frequent. 
The development of legislative foundations during 1849 testify to the fact that 
awareness of the necessity of the most rapid possible modernization of Croatian 
society was dominant even in official Croatian political circles, even though 
official state institutions, particularly the Sabor of 1848, often functioned using 
the terminology of historical rights, particularly when addressing the king, 
due to the need for a legitimist approach. On the other hand, from the very 
beginning of the revolution, the merger of historical with natural rights was 
42   For more details on these matters, see: T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 315-323.
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present in the Zagreb press, although the references to natural rights became 
considerably more frequent until proclamation of the imposed Constitution. 
The reason for this is that the press was not directly involved in the actual 
achievement of political objectives, such as addressing the king. There was also 
the belief, especially during 1848, that the basic political achievements of the 
revolution were not threatened and the considerably more intense advocacy 
of concepts, like South Slav ties, meant expansion of the narrower and basic 
Croatian program, and which could not be justified by arguments steeped 
in historical rights. Even the social composition of the editorial boards and 
correspondents of Zagreb’s newspapers favored the more frequent emphasis 
on natural rights, for this was a secular bourgeois intelligentsia, which was 
not significantly bound by the institutions and values of the old feudal 
order. The situation would change somewhat with the proclamation of the 
imposed Constitution, which was grounded on the assertion by the Vienna 
court and government that the Hungarians “gambled away” their historical 
rights with their revolution. This prompted Croatian writers to increasingly 
stress Croatia’s state/historical rights and prove that the Croats could not 
have forsaken their historical rights, for not only did they refuse to join the 
Hungarian rebellion, they in fact made great sacrifices for the dynasty and 
the Monarchy. Articles calling for the modernization of Croatia’s economy, 
schools and state institutions continued to appear, but now pleas for “Croatia’s 
ancient constitution” and Croatia’s historical state individuality began to 
appear with increasing frequency, especially in Slavenski Jug, which did not 
defend feudalism and the moribund aristocratic system, but rather the idea of 
centuries of continuity of Croatian statehood, particularly in comparison to 
the Austrian provinces. The historical right was, to be sure, a potent weapon in 
political struggles within the legitimist Habsburg Monarchy, which Croatian 
politics often exploited in combination with modern natural rights, although, 
ultimately, historical and legal arguments were not decisive, but rather the 
prevailing political and military power. Historical rights in both cases, in 
state institutions and in the Zagreb press, served as a means to more easily 
achieve Croatia’s national objectives. They were, truth be told, directly derived 
from the feudal system and demonstrated the weakness of the new bourgeois 
factors in eliminating the system of legitimization of the Habsburg Monarchy. 
However, assuming the form of national or bourgeois historicism, it introduced 
new content to an old form, adapted to the needs of new times and Croatian 
nationalism. The enactment of the imposed Constitution was followed by 
the reappearance of defenses in the press, otherwise frequent prior to 1848 
among Croatian political writers and activists, of the traditional autonomy of 
the Transleithan lands, although stripped of the desire for restoration of the 
Croato-Hungarian alliance, which was severed in April 1848. This was stressed 
based on the desire to warn of the potential and even, as it appeared at the 
time to Croatian writers, very likely disastrous consequences of the Austrian 
government’s centralist policies. In the spring and summer of 1849, this view 
did not, however, predominate in any of the Zagreb-based periodicals, for the 
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still dominant demand called for the division of “Hungary” along national 
lines and ties between the Hungarian subject peoples on a “federal” basis with 
the Austrian lands based on the concepts of Austro-Slavism. It was only in 
the autumn of 1849 that a partial renewal of Hungaro-patriotism (frequent in 
Croatian politics prior to 1848) appeared, particularly in Slavenski Jug, whereby 
the constitutionality – no longer, to be sure, of the feudal-aristocratic type – of 
the Croatian crown lands was incomparably superior to the unconstitutionality 
of “absolutism” of the Austrian provinces. The idea of nationalism and a new 
civil society, present in the Zagreb press as well as in the activities of Croatian 
state institutions, also signified acceptance of the idea of “democracy” in the 
modern sense, i.e. the principle of national sovereignty, civil and religious 
equality, freedom of the press and association, parliamentarism, modern 
constitutionality, etc. “Democratic” ideas were advocated by the Zagreb press 
in particular, for these papers were edited by members of the middle class 
and the bourgeois intelligentsia. They signified aspirations for development 
of a modern civil society and civic institutions in the political, national, legal, 
economic, cultural, educational and other fields. Some Croatian political 
officials, particularly those politicians associated with the Court, such as Franjo 
Kulmer and Metel Ožegović, although nationally oriented, did not favorably 
view the inroads made by “democratic” concepts among the Croatian public, 
seeing them as excessive and radical.
Until spring 1849, there was no major polarization within the Croatian 
political movement. The Sabor’s representative before the Vienna government, 
Franjo Kulmer, criticized the “radical” writings of individual Zagreb newspapers, 
particularly Slavenski Jug and Südslawische Zeitung, in some letters written to 
Jelačić in late 1848 and early 1849. However, the strengthening of conservative 
forces and the rise of reaction in Austria spurred a part of the Croatian political 
scene and public to confront the altered situation and the impossibility of 
achieving even a major part of the Croatian national objectives. This group, 
associated with Kulmer and Metel Ožegović in Vienna, and the newspaper 
Agramer Zeitung in Croatia, believed that Croatian politics should not come 
into conflict with the Vienna government, rather it should seek a modus vivendi 
to achieve a minimum of a few objectives. The second group, associated with 
the remaining three Zagreb papers, opted for political confrontation and 
open criticism, although without acceptance of Hungarian separatism. In 
Croatia at that time there were no data on the activities of any organized anti-
Austrian groups, even though there probably were individuals with such an 
orientation.43 The national intolerance of the Hungarian movement barred any 
43   The editor of Slavenski Jug, Dragutin Kušlan, met with a Hungarian envoy in Belgrade in 
June 1849 to discuss the possibility of establishing an anti-Austrian coalition. However, this was 
a personal effort on his part, without backing by Croatian public opinion, including his paper, 
which he soon left without leaving any significant mark on the Croatian public. On this, see: T. 
Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 334-336.
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manner of ties between Croatian and Hungarian politics. Official Croatian 
politics attempted to steer a middle course, i.e. without direct confrontation 
with the Austrian government, but without any intention of voluntarily 
conceding to centralizing policies. In April 1848 a delegation was sent to 
Vienna, consisting of Ivan Mažuranić, Ivan Kukuljević, Antun Vranyczany 
and Franjo Žigrović. It submitted a memorandum to the king from the Ban’s 
Council and the Sabor’s Grand Committee which sought the ratification of 
the Sabor”s principal conclusions on state autonomy and Croatia’s territorial 
integrity, but they accomplished nothing, besides some vague phrases and 
expressions of gratitude to the “ever faithful Croatian people.” In March 1849, 
a memorandum was addressed to the king, condemning the pro-Hungarian 
policies of Prince Windischgrätz, the commander of Austrian troops in 
Hungary, and proposing, after the war’s end, the dissolution of the adjourned 
Sabor and the convocation of a new one. Jelačić, according to some meager 
information, did not oppose the dissolution of the parliament and the imposed 
Constitution, but he nonetheless did not, until the end of July 1849, ask the 
Ban’s Council to formally promulgate it. At that time, the spring of 1849, it was 
believed that the Sabor would have to deliberate on the Constitution.44
Among the other events important to the Croatian political movement 
of 1848-1849, the work of the Sabor’s committees should be mentioned, as 
during 1849 they drafted several legislative bills.45 The Sabor was adjourned 
until further notice in July 1848, but it had appointed several committees, 
which were supposed to compile bills on individual issues which would be 
deliberated once the Sabor reconvened. Work on these bills commenced in 
January 1849, when it appeared that the Hungarian revolution had dissipated 
and the Sabor would quickly be reconvened. The bill on counties, drafted in 
January 1849 and submitted to the districts for consideration, stressed the 
need to preserve the counties as national institutions and a component of the 
constitutional tradition, as well as the need for their reform as institutions 
accountable to parliamentary government. The county assemblies were 
supposed to decide on the most important economic and social problems, 
the modernization of education, the maintenance of roads and other vital 
issues in their territories. The reformed counties were supposed to become 
the administrative foundation of the autonomous Croatian state and a vital 
driver of the modernization of Croatian society. The bill on the government, 
entitled “an article on the organization of the state council,” was completed 
in late January 1849 and it was also sent to the districts for consideration. It 
stressed the need for the creation of an autonomous Croatian government, 
which would handle all affairs in the territory of the Triune Kingdom, except 
those, meaning military, foreign and financial affairs, which would be left to the 
central constitutional institutions, the Austrian government and parliament. 
44   T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 280-292.
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The government would be answerable to the Croatian Sabor. The bill on the 
Sabor, drafted in March 1849, left all autonomous affairs to the Sabor. The 
Sabor would be elected in a two-tier system, with the election of electors first 
in the wards, and then the election of parliamentary deputies in the districts. 
The institution of virilists would be discontinued, while an elector would 
represent the entire country. The Sabor bill foresaw, in contrast to the earlier 
situation, the existence of a bicameral legislature, with the division based on 
the property census. The Sabor’s authority would be limited by the king’s veto, 
but the king could not make any decisions concerning the Triune Kingdom 
without the Sabor’s consent. The bill on the people’s army, drafted in April 
1849 and issued as a separate brochure, stressed the creation of the Croatian 
people’s army as a separate component of the Austrian military. The people’s 
army would be charged with defending Croatia’s southern border and possibly 
become a significant factor in the resolution of the Eastern Question. The army 
bill reflected the growing mistrust in Croatian political circles of the policies 
of the Vienna government, for Croatia’s autonomy was to be protected by all 
means, even those which contradicted acceptance of joint affairs. The bill on 
the Triune Kingdom’s relationship with Austria, drafted in April 1849, was 
founded on the distinction between joint (military, foreign and financial) and 
autonomous affairs, but it said nothing of Austro-Slavism or the federalist 
reorganization of the Monarchy. The schooling bill was drafted by the end of 
August 1849, generally on modeled after the Austrian schooling law, albeit 
adapted to Croatian circumstances. Its basic intention was to modernize 
Croatia’s school system, from public primary schools, which were supposed 
to provide basic education, to the universities. Schooling was an autonomous 
Croatian concern, which was the responsibility of the Sabor and government. 
The bill stipulated the secular organization of schooling, wherein clerical 
institutions, above all the Catholic Church, would lose their until then crucial 
importance. Nothing came of the drafting of these bills, as the adjourned Sabor 
never again convened, although they demonstrated the Croatian political elite’s 
commitment to building a modern civil society.
The Austrian government exercised no direct authority in Croatia and 
Slavonia during the revolution of 1848-1849. However, Vienna carefully 
monitored political changes, particularly the growing opposition mood, which 
could have theoretically led to stronger anti-Austrian tendencies. Already in 
December 1848, Jelačić asked the Ban’s Council to exercise greater control over 
the “radical” writing of individual Zagreb papers by drafting a press law, and not 
long afterward he requested that one copy of all newspapers be sent to Vienna. 
At the time the Ban’s Council, citing the difficult political circumstances, 
avoided enacting a press law, but this became possible in the spring of 1849. 
Jelačić briefly came to Zagreb in the spring of 1849 and ordered the Ban’s 
Council Education Section to draft the “Interim Press Law.” This “law” was 
actually the ban’s decree, whereby Jelačić once more overstepped his dictatorial 
authority, affixing his signature as “ban and dictator” and stipulating a high 
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surety for newspapers and the possibility of criminal prosecution for legal 
violations and disturbances of public opinion. The decree was justified by the 
“unrestrained” and “wanton” writing of individual papers, especially Slavenski 
Jug and Südslawische Zeitung.46 The Zagreb papers, except Agramer Zeitung, 
generally condemned the ban’s decree as an attempt to smother freedom of 
the press and ignore the deeper causes of dissatisfaction in Croatia, but they 
laid the blame squarely on the Education Section, concealing Jelačić’s central 
role.47 The decree’s repressive provisions were not actually implemented in 
subsequent months, but all of the papers had to pay the stipulated surety. 
Jelačić later complained to the ban regent that the press “law” remained 
a dead letter, for the bulletins of the “revolutionary parties” – he meant the 
two most radical newspapers – continued to disseminate their propaganda 
unimpeded. Jelačić faulted the Zagreb press for its excessive criticism of the 
Austrian government and fanning of national and political intolerance, instead 
of “peaceful” advocacy of reforms.48
During June and July 1849, political polarization in Croatia deepened, 
for Gaj’s Narodne novine abandoned the opposition course and increasingly 
adopted a pro-government stance, not greatly different form Agramer Zeitung. 
Bogoslav Šulek assumed the editorial post at Slavenski Jug, which, together 
with Südslawische Zeitung, continued in an opposition spirit, but in more 
muted tones than previously. During July and August 1849, the Croatian press 
was characterized by major polemics over the extension of the jurisdiction of 
central institutions in Vienna over Croatian affairs. These were ignited by the 
king’s patent on the resolution of the urbarial question in Croatia, in which the 
Sabor’s conclusions were entirely ignored, although Croatia’s state autonomy 
remained the key issue. The opposition press called for broad political 
autonomy in relation to Vienna and the rejection of all centralist measures put 
forth by the Vienna government, while the pro-government press deemed it 
more practical to cooperate with the government. Polarization also ensued after 
promulgation of the imposed Constitution in Croatia and Slavonia in August 
1849, which the opposition press rejected as contrary to Croatia’s autonomy, 
while the pro-government press accepted it as a necessary evil. The opposition 
press defended the Ban’s Council as an autonomous Croatian government, 
stressing that, due to wartime circumstances, they could do nothing about 
social and economic reforms.49
In May 1849, the fate of the Hungarian revolutionary movement was 
sealed due to the intervention of the Russian imperial army on behalf of 
46   NSK, ZR, ZL, Ban Jelačić, R VIIIa B-2.
47  T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 336-346. Jelačić’s alleged “law” was never applied, and 
when a serious attempt was made to do so, in a lawsuit against Slavenski Jug field in February 
1850, all of its legal and substantive shortcomings became apparent.
48  T. Markus, Hrvatski politički pokret, 344-346.
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the Viennese court. Under these circumstances, the promulgation of the 
imposed Constitution in Croatia and Slavonia could no longer be postponed. 
At the end of July 1849, Jelačić formally endorsed its ratification, asking for a 
Croatian commission to be sent to Vienna to discuss the Sabor’s conclusions 
with the government within the framework of the state constitution. In a 
public proclamation issued on July 28, 1849, Jelačić asserted that the imposed 
Constitution must be accepted, for its met all of Croatia’s national demands. 
Jelačić sent copies of the Constitution to all districts and the Ban’s Council 
with the request that they promulgate it as soon as possible. Initially the 
Ban’s Council rejected the ban’s request, calling on Croatian autonomy, but 
it soon had to concede. The Constitution was promulgated in Civil Croatia 
and Slavonia in September 1849. The protests carried in the opposition press 
were of little avail. Upon the conclusion of military operations, the organized 
Croatian political movement also dissipated. After the close of the war, Civil 
Croatia soon lost the broad political autonomy it had enjoyed during the 
revolution. The imposed Constitution was promulgated in September 1849, 
and in subsequent months the Ban’s Council, like Ban Jelačić himself, became 
a transmitter for the Vienna government’s orders. Although he attempted to 
safeguard certain Croatian achievements, Jelačić always gave in to pressure 
in the end, and sometimes he even led the way in suppressing the opposition 
mood. This was particularly reflected in the repressive measures initiated 
against the two remaining opposition papers, Slavenski Jug and Südslawische 
Zeitung, of which the first was banned at the ban’s explicit order, while the 
second temporarily continued to be published, but with considerably toned-
down criticism. These and other measures led to the almost complete loss of 
any popularity Jelačić had among the public, which particularly came to the 
fore during the ban’s orchestrated arrival in Zagreb in June 1850. The Ban’s 
Council could not resist the spread of centralization and Germanization, 
particularly through the Financial Directorate under the leadership of Vinzenz 
Kappel, even though attempts were made to preserve the Croatian language 
in correspondence with foreign institutions. In the summer of 1850, the Ban’s 
Council was dissolved and its activities, now exclusively on behalf of the Vienna 
government’s interests, were assumed by the Ban’s Government. The Sabor 
was formally dissolved by royal rescript in April 1850, in which individual 
conclusions of the Sabor were ratified as long as they posed no threat to the 
centralization of the Monarchy. In the principal law governing the Military 
Frontier, enacted in May 1850, limited reforms were implemented, but the 
separation of the Military Frontier from Croatia proper, as well as German as 
the official language, were retained. During the 1850s, a centralist structure 
prevailed in the Monarchy with predominance of the German language, which 
would also be extended to Croatia, particularly by means of numerous resettled 
bureaucrats (“Bach’s hussars”). This meant that the Croatian movement, 
although successful in contributing to the Monarchy’s preservation, failed 
in all of its principal aspirations, particularly the achievement of broad state 
autonomy and territorial integrity. However, at this time, all of the fundamental 
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ideas and programs (Austro-Slavism, federal reorganization of the Monarchy, 
ties among the Slavic and South Slav peoples, narrower Croatian aims and the 
modernization of Croatian society) which would remain present in Croatian 
political and public life until 1918, were put forward.
II. The revolution of 1848-1849 and the question of the Croatian 
national identity
The key role in the Croatian political movement of 1848-1849 was played 
by elite with diverse social, economic and, to an extent, ethnic backgrounds. 
Most were Croats, but there was also a very numerous Serbian minority, which 
accounted for almost one half of the deputies in the Sabor in 1848. This elite 
was socially divided into members of the modern bourgeoisie, which generated 
almost all of the activist writers, and members of the older group of nobles, who 
had their origins in the feudal period but were uninterested in its perpetuation. 
The Croatian political elite tended toward the gradual dismantling of the still 
surviving feudal order and the development of a modern civil society based 
on a capitalist economy, parliamentary system and accountable government, 
press freedoms and other political liberties, greater political egalitarianism, 
and so forth. Its orientation was essentially liberal, but in the nineteenth-
century sense with very strong hierarchical elements, particularly the exclusion 
of women and most of the population from political decision-making. In 
Croatia and Slavonia at the time, the peasantry accounted for a vast majority 
of the population, over four fifths, and except for a very narrow circle of the 
wealthiest, they had absolutely no political influence nor did they have an 
interest in national politics. The explicit hierarchism and the class stratification 
were abetted by very strong proto-feudal elements, which held very clear-cut 
conservative political views and placed loyalty to the Viennese court above 
all other considerations. This pertained to Ban Jelačić in particular, but also 
other distinguished individuals in Croatian politics of the time, such as Count 
Kulmer, who was appointed by the Sabor as its representative to the Court. 
There was a difference between the democratic orientation of a considerable 
sector of the Croatian public, particularly those gathered around the Zagreb 
press, and many distinguished “old school” politicians, who viewed the new 
egalitarian and democratic/liberal ideas with suspicion. The Croatian elite 
engaged in activities typical of a small nation attempting to achieve territorial 
integrity and limited autonomy within a multiethnic empire. This was then the 
sole realistic option, for it was shown that even a considerably stronger political 
movement, like that of the Hungarians, could not secure an independent 
state.
The political movement of 1848-1849 in Croatia and Slavonia was vital 
to the creation of the modern Croatian nation and the formation of modern 
Croatian nationalism. Like all other peoples, for the Croats nationalism was an 
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exceptionally modern phenomenon, associated with the creation of an urban/
industrial (bourgeois) society, a capitalist economy, a politically-aware public, 
modern communications, literacy for the broad masses, etc. Nationalism entails 
strong tendencies for group homogenization and collective cohesion, often in 
opposition to a real or imagined external adversary. The national movement 
in Croatia and Slavonia in 1848-1849 exhibited all of the typical features of 
nationalism, from the nation-as-imagined-community to competition with 
other nationalisms in the struggle for control of a living space. Inter-human 
competition encompasses a fear of domination by others, and this was readily 
apparent in the Croatian movement of the time. The fear of German and/or 
Hungarian domination and the centralizing/Germanizing policies of Vienna 
constantly beset Croatian political and public activists, not just at that time, 
but before and after, until the collapse of the Monarchy. Attempts at political 
homogenization were made on this basis to retain or acquire control over 
the political territory of the Triune Kingdom. Croatian nationalism, like the 
nationalism of other small peoples in the Habsburg Monarchy, generally did 
not aspire to create an independent national state, rather only broad autonomy 
within the Monarchy. An independent Croatian state was advocated, after 
1860, by individual politicians and public activists generally associated with 
the Party of the Right, but they remained marginal until the First World 
War. As in many other countries, modernizing processes in Croatia were 
not primarily the result of internal factors, such as increased population, as 
they were of external pressures. The political and social elite in the Triune 
Kingdom was compelled to initiate modernization due to fear of falling 
behind neighboring countries. Any country that rejected modernization soon 
became a colony and prey for more powerful neighboring peoples and states. 
These processes proceeded in the Croatian lands in a manner similar to other 
countries, but with some significantly specific aspects. During the course of 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, the domestic elite, often in conflict 
with the centers of power in Vienna and Budapest, implemented the spread of 
literacy, the development of educational, economic and other institutions and 
communications, established a market economy and attempted to bolster ties 
between individual provinces within the framework of a politically centralized 
system. However, modernization was constantly impeded from the outside, for 
external power centers, Vienna in the case of Istria and Dalmatia, Budapest in 
the case of Croatia and Slavonia after 1867, had no interest in an economically 
and politically stronger Triune Kingdom. An additional burden was the political 
and territorial separation of the Croatian lands, for the Military Frontier was 
incorporated into Civil Croatia only in the early 1880s, while Dalmatia and 
Istria remained in the Austrian portion of the Dual Monarchy until 1918.
In the revolution of 1848-1849, Zagreb unambiguously became a national-
integrative center. Although not a large city by the standards of the time – in 
the mid-nineteenth century it had a population of roughly 13,000 – Zagreb 
was the political nucleus of the Croatian movement, in which the Sabor met 
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and all of the most important state institutions were located, from the ban to 
the Ban’s Council. Provincial particularism was very powerful at the time, and 
quite marked in the Slavonian counties. Due to its specific social situation and 
political remoteness from Northern Croatia, the Croatian national movement 
only began to develop in Dalmatia in the 1860s. During the revolution, the 
foundations were laid for the formation of a modern civil urban/industrial 
society and, within it, the modern Croatian nation. Croatian public activists 
accepted all of the fundamental aspects and values of the modern civil society: 
public opinion, freedom of the press, a market economy, modern roads, a 
parliamentary system, modern political organization, social and economic 
reform, a standard literary language, a modern administrative system, an official 
(national) language, etc. The legislative bills drafted by the Sabor’s committees 
testify to this in particular; although they remained a dead letter, they indicate 
the commitment of Croatia’s political activists to the institutions and values of 
a civil society in the sense of nineteenth-century liberalism. Due to wartime 
circumstances and the shortness of time, this generally remained at the level of 
theory a the time, and only in later decades would it begin to be implemented 
in practice in cooperation but also in conflict with the integrative centers in 
Vienna and Budapest. Among the practical accomplishments, notable was the 
abolishment of serfdom in Civil Croatia and Slavonia, and the elimination 
of urbarial levies and the recognition of peasant possession of rural plough-
lands in the former. Another major achievement was the introduction of the 
national (Shtokavian) language in all public and state institutions, from the 
Sabor and Ban’s Council to county and city governments, whereby Latin finally 
ceased being the means of public communication. Alongside later changes, 
such as Vienna’s revision of the urbarial issues and the imposition of limited 
Germanization in the 1850s, these remained permanent changes. During 
the revolution, all fundamental modernizing processes were theoretically 
accepted: the comprehensive reformation of Croatian society in the direction 
of civic modernization – which would later be achieved at varying rates and 
with many difficulties. As a result, traditional rural and regional communities, 
in which the peasantry was extremely dominant, were gradually integrated 
and mutually connected in the creation of civic institutions, urban centers and 
a capitalist economy. These processes, with all of their specifics, were basically 
quite similar to modernization in other European countries in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.
During the revolution of 1848-1849, all of the fundamental political 
objectives and programs were formulated, and these would be fostered by 
various groups and parties in Croatian politics until the collapse of the Habsburg 
Monarchy. First and foremost among these was the territorial unification 
of the Croatian lands into a single political unit with broad state autonomy 
within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. This was the basic and 
minimum point of departure for all political groups, even though pragmatism 
could dictate considerable limitations to autonomy so conceived, more in 
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the direction of a province rather than statehood. The official institutions of 
Croatian politics, the Sabor, the ban, the Ban’s Council, the Regency of the 
1860s, the Ban’s Government after 1868, and most counties, generally did 
not advocate the Austro-Slav concept, restricting themselves to the narrower 
Croatian aims. However, this concept was often present among the Croatian 
public and in the platforms of individual political parties. The reorganization 
of the Monarchy into a (con) federally bound group of countries and equal 
peoples was a maximum objective. The middle ground was often occupied by 
an aspiration occasionally present in official Croatian politics and considerably 
more often among the wider public, calling for ties with neighboring Slovene 
provinces in the west and the Serbs of Hungary in the east. Attempts at Slavic 
and South Slavic ties constituted a base for Croatian national interests, for the 
small Slavic peoples could not on their own resist the predominance of the two 
strongest peoples: the Germans and Hungarians. The Austro-Slav and South 
Slav concepts remained at the level of more or less unrealistic desires and in 
no way brought into question the process of constituting the modern Croatian 
nation. The Croatian national identity was at the time clearly formed both at the 
ideological level – particularly in relation to neighboring national movements 
– and at the practical level, in the beginnings of organized implementation of 
modernization.
The events at the time of the revolution of 1848-1849 also carried great 
significance for the Croats in international relations. The Croatian name, 
until then entirely unknown to the wider European public, was often 
mentioned in European periodicals and brochures of the time, although 
mostly in a negative context. The term “Croats” generally denoted Habsburg 
“Mamelukes,” the servants of reaction and the suppressors of “progressive” 
revolutionary aspirations. Such negative stereotypes particularly influenced 
radical leftist intellectuals in later decades, such as Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels. However, the affirmation of the Croatian name, as a protagonist in the 
European community of peoples, was also a precondition for a positive image, 
which gradually emerged in the years prior to World War I, when the Croats 
had some well-known advocates among the European intelligentsia, such as 
Robert W. Seton-Watson. This was also enhanced by the foreign activities of 
certain distinguished Croatian national activists, from Eugen Kvaternik to 
Stjepan Radić.
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Zwischen revolution und legitimität: die kroatische politische be-
wegung 1848/1849 und die bildung kroatischer nationaler Identität
Zusammenfassung
Geschehnisse zur Zeit der Revolution in den Jahren 1848/1849 hatten 
große Bedeutung für Kroaten auch in internationalen Beziehungen. Der kro-
atische Name, der in der breiteren europäischen Öffentlichkeit bis dann fast 
unbekannt war, wurde zu dieser Zeit oft in zeitgemäßer europäischer Peri-
odik und in Broschüren genannt, obwohl meistens im negativen Kontext. Der 
Name “Kroate” wurde hauptsächlich mit dem Begriff “habsburgische Mame-
lucken” gleichgesetzt als Knechten von Reaktion und Unterdrücker fortschrit-
tlicher revolutionärer Streben. Diese negativen Stereotype beeinflussten später 
Jahrzehnte lang besonders radikale links orientierte Intellektuelle wie z.B. Karl 
Marx und Friedrich Engels. Die Affirmation des kroatischen Namens als eines 
der Protagonisten in europäischer Nationengemeinschaft war aber auch not-
wendige Bedingung für ein positives Bild der Kroaten, das sich allmählich in 
den Jahren vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg bildete, als Kroaten auch einige bekannte 
Befürworter unter europäischen Intellektuellen hatten, wie es beispielsweise 
Robert W. Seton-Watson war. Zur Verschönerung dieses Bildes trugen auch 
die Aktivitäten einiger angesehenen kroatischen nationalen Aktivisten bei, 
von Eugen Kvaternik bis Stjepan Radić.

